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Abstract 
We study empirically the macroeconomic effects of an explicit de jure quantitative goal for 
monetary policy.  Quantitative goals take three forms: exchange rates, money growth rates, and 
inflation targets.  We analyze the effects on inflation of both having a quantitative target, and of 
hitting a declared target; we also consider effects on output volatility.  Our empirical work uses 
an annual data set covering 42 countries between 1960 and 2000, and takes account of other 
determinants of inflation (such as fiscal policy, the business cycle, and openness to international 
trade), and the endogeneity of the monetary policy regime.  We find that both having and hitting 
quantitative targets for monetary policy is systematically and robustly associated with lower 
inflation.  The exact form of the monetary target matters somewhat (especially for the 
sustainability of the monetary regime), but is less important than having some quantitative target.  
Successfully achieving a quantitative monetary goal is also associated with less volatile output. 
 
 
Keywords: transparency; exchange; rate; money; growth; inflation; target; business cycle. 
 








The economics profession has gradually moved to the view that transparency in monetary 
(and other) policies is desirable.  For instance, the IMF believes that transparent policies are both 
more effective and enhance accountability. But while the theoretical advantages of transparency 
have been much analyzed, there is less in the way of empirical support.  One objective of this 
paper is to help fill that gap.   
We approach this problem empirically by using a panel of annual data covering over 
forty countries from 1960 through 2000.  We identify “transparent” targets for monetary policy 
with “quantitative” targets.  Quantitative targets are easily measured, allowing the monetary 
authority’s successes (or lack thereof) to be determined mechanistically.  That is, quantitative 
targets are transparent since they can be assessed without (much) debatable personal judgment.  
However, we are not interested in just the effects of having a transparent policy, but also in the 
effects of successful transparent policy.  That is, we are interested in both the de jure monetary 
regime, and the de facto success of a central bank in hitting its target (if one exists).  Using 
regression analysis, we find that in practice countries with transparent targets for monetary 
policy achieve lower inflation, holding other things constant.  We also find that countries that hit 
their targets achieve lower inflation. 
In practice, central banks have used three types of quantitative monetary targets, with 
varying degrees of success: exchange rates, money growth rates, and inflation targets.  A number 
of economists in the past have analyzed the effects of one of these regimes.  For instance, there is 
a large and growing literature on countries with inflation targets.  There is an even larger 
literature that compares the merits of fixed and floating exchange rate regimes.  Rather than 
focusing on any one of these targets, we use all three.  In part this is because we are interested in 
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estimating the effect of transparency in monetary policy, and transparency can take different 
forms.  Indeed, when we compare the effects of different quantitative targets for monetary policy 
(exchange rate/money growth/inflation) on inflationary outcomes, we find differences, but they 
are small compared to the presence of any transparent target. 
Still, we combine together different types of targets for monetary policy for a more 
important reason, best explained with an example.  Fixed exchange rates are well-defined 
monetary policies, and are often compared with floating exchange rate regimes.  But a float is 
not a well-defined monetary policy!  Similarly, central banks that do not target inflation have to 
do something else.  By using data for all quantitative monetary regimes, we can reasonably 
compare the merits of having a transparent monetary policy to the alternative, which we consider 
to be “opaque monetary objective(s).” 
6
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1.  Introduction and Motivation 
The economics profession has gradually moved to the view that transparency in monetary 
(and other) policies is desirable.  For instance, the IMF believes that transparent policies are both 
more effective and enhance accountability.  Accordingly, the Fund encourages countries “… to 
state clearly the role, responsibility and objectives of the central bank.  The objectives of the 
central bank should be clearly defined, publicly disclosed and written into law.”
1  But while the 
theoretical advantages of transparency have been much analyzed, there is less in the way of 
empirical support.  One objective of this paper is to help fill that gap.   
We approach this problem empirically by using a panel of annual data covering over 
forty countries from 1960 through 2000.  We identify “transparent” targets for monetary policy 
with “quantitative” targets.  Quantitative targets are easily measured, allowing the monetary 
authority’s successes (or lack thereof) to be determined mechanistically.  That is, quantitative 
targets are transparent since they can be assessed without (much) debatable personal judgment.  
However, we are not interested only in the effects of transparent policy, but in the effects of 
successful transparent policy; that is we are interested in both the de jure monetary regime, and 
the de facto success of a central bank in hitting its target (if one exists).  Using regression 
analysis, we find that in practice countries with transparent targets for monetary policy achieve 
lower inflation, holding other things constant.  We also find that countries that hit their targets 
achieve lower inflation. 
In practice, central banks have used three types of quantitative monetary targets (with 
varying degrees of success): exchange rates, money growth rates, and inflation targets.  A 
number of economists in the past have analyzed the effects of one of these regimes.  For 
instance, there is a large and growing literature on countries with inflation targets.  There is an 
                                                 
1  http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/mtransp.htm 
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even larger literature that compares the merits of fixed and floating exchange rate regimes.  
Rather than focusing on any one of these targets, we use all three.  In part this is because we are 
interested in estimating the effect of transparency in monetary policy, and transparency can take 
different forms.  Indeed, when we compare the effects of different quantitative targets for 
monetary policy (exchange rate/money growth/inflation) on inflationary outcomes, we find 
differences, but they are small compared to the presence of any transparent target. 
Still, we combine together different types of targets for monetary policy for a more 
important reason, which is best explained with an example.  Fixed exchange rates are well-
defined monetary policies, and are often compared with floating exchange rate regimes.  But a 
float is not a well-defined monetary policy!  Similarly, central banks that do not target inflation 
have to do something else.  By using data for all quantitative monetary regimes, we can 
reasonably compare the merits of having a transparent monetary policy to the alternative, which 
we consider to be “opaque monetary objective(s).” 
In section 2, we review the extensive literature of relevance; our methodology and data 
set are presented afterwards.  The core of our paper is in section 4, which presents our results for 
inflation, along with sensitivity analysis.  We then analyze the effects of quantitative targets on 
the short run/business cycle volatility of output.  A brief conclusion closes. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
Our work is related to a number of other classic problems in economics.  One is the 
choice of monetary target.  Different target have different degrees of transparency (as well as 
other attributes); accordingly, many scholars have addressed the question of whether central 
8
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banks should use the exchange rate, the money growth rate, the inflation rate, or something else.
2  
Most of this literature is concerned with exchange rate regimes.  There is an enormous literature 
that compares the attributes of fixed and floating exchange rate regimes, both theoretically and 
empirically.  Still, to repeat a standard but important criticism of this area, a fixed exchange rate 
is a well-defined monetary policy, but a floating exchange rate regime is not.  If the monetary 
authorities are not pegging the exchange rate, they must be doing something else.  Because of the 
recent increase in the adoption of inflation targets, we have seen a shift in the literature towards 
the study of inflation targeting regimes.  Another related literature is that of the optimal degree of 
transparency in monetary policy.
3   
There is also a literature that has focused on the role of domestic institutions in the 
conduct of monetary policy, most of which is centred on the effects of independence of central 
banks, and/or, more recently, on inflation targets.  Although these areas of the literature are 
ultimately addressing the same issue (how monetary policy regimes affect macroeconomic 
outcomes), it is fair to say that, to a large extent, they have been developed separately.  We now 
review some of the key papers in each of these strands of literature, summarizing their main 
insights. 
 
Exchange Rate Regimes 
The macroeconomic effect of the exchange rate regime is still an open question, one that 
is associated with many controversies in both the international and monetary economics 
literatures.  There is a broad literature that deals with the theoretical analysis on the costs and 
benefits of different exchange rate arrangements and there is a consensus on the main factors that 
                                                 
2  See e.g., Atkeson and Kehoe (2001) NBER WP 8681. 
3  See e.g., Faust and Svensson (2002), and Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). 
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shape these costs and benefits.  However, there are still many disagreements on the relative 
empirical importance of these factors.  As a result, when it comes to the best monetary policy 
regime for a given country, most of the predictions are inconclusive as they depend on a variety 
of assumptions that can only be validated empirically.  Relative to the theoretical literature, there 
have been fewer papers that have taken these assumptions to a test or that, more generally, have 
empirically estimated the implications of monetary policy regimes. 
One of the first papers to provide a comprehensive empirical study of the effects of 
different exchange rate regimes on macroeconomic outcomes is Baxter and Stockman (1989).  
Using a cross-section of countries with different exchange rate regime, they looked at the 
association between the exchange rate regime and variables such as output, consumption, trade 
flows, government consumption and the real exchange rate.  Their conclusion was that the 
exchange rate regime did not matter for most of the macroeconomic variables, with the exception 
of the real exchange rate (that was more volatile under flexible exchange rate systems).  Flood 
and Rose (1995) corroborate and extend this finding to other determinants of exchange rates. 
Most of the studies that have followed Baxter and Stockman (1989) have had a narrower 
focus; they look mainly into the consequences on inflation and output volatility.  Recent studies 
by Ghosh et al.  (1997, 2002) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) provide detailed 
analyses of the effects of exchange rate regimes on inflation.  The approach is to look initially at 
the marginal effect of the exchange rate regime, after controlling for the effect of money growth.  
The hypothesis is that the exchange rate regime has a direct effect on the relationship between 
money and inflation, beyond any potential indirect effect through the conduct of monetary policy 
(i.e. on money growth rates).  There is evidence that inflation is lower under fixed rate regimes.
4 
                                                 
4 In the case of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) there is also a test of the indirect effect of the regime on 
inflation via money growth.  Money growth is regressed on GDP growth (lagged), money growth lagged, openness, 
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Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) and Ghosh et al.  (1997) study the effects on 
business cycle volatility and growth. Regarding business cycle volatility, their results are 
consistent: fixed exchange rate regimes are associated to greater output volatility.  Regarding 
growth effects, the papers reach different conclusions.  While Ghosh et al.  (1997) do not find 
strong evidence in any direction Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) conclude that growth is 
higher for floaters. 
 
Domestic Institutions 
Even for countries where the discussion on exchange rate regimes is not important (in 
most cases because of the adoption of floating exchange rates), there has been an active recent 
debate on optimal monetary policy.  The two key issues are typically whether the central bank 
should have goal-independence, and whether it should have an explicit inflation target. 
Regarding the independence of central banks, the literature has focused on the observed 
negative correlation between inflation and central bank independence as documented in Alesina 
and Summers (1993), Cukierman (1992) or Grilli et al. (1991). 
The other main features of monetary policy that have been studied in this literature are 
the effects of explicit targets and transparency.  Initially the analysis was centred on money 
targets, but as countries moved away from these targets into inflation ones, the focus of the 
literature has moved accordingly.  Because of the lack of a large number of observations, the 
literature tends to be descriptive, based on case studies rather than cross-country regressions.  
Mishkin (1999) and the books by Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999) and Loayza and 
Soto (2002) present good surveys and case studies of money and inflation targeting.  Overall the 
                                                                                                                                                             
budget balance, a set of regional dummies and the exchange rate dummies.  Once again long pegs are the only cases 
where there seems to be a significant negative effect on inflation, in this case through lower money growth. 
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evidence is mixed.  There is evidence that inflation targets have helped countries reduce their 
inflation rates (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002).  On the other hand, Ball and Sheridan 
(2005) argue that this effect has been due to factors other than the monetary regime (while 
assuming that inflation reverts to a low mean). 
 
Regimes 
In all the literature reviewed above, two issues appear repeatedly: the characterization of 
monetary policy regimes (especially when it comes to exchange rate regimes) and the problem of 
endogeneity. 
Classification of regimes: words or actions?  When it comes to the classification of 
exchange rate regimes, there are two possible approaches.  The first is to look at the officially 
declared de jure regime.  The problem with this approach is that we often observe in practice that 
countries sometimes peg their exchange rate without a clear de jure commitment (or intervene 
frequently despite having declared a floating exchange rate, the “fear of floating” as defined by 
Calvo and Reinhart, 2000).  As an alternative one can look at actions and classify regimes but 
looking at the actual behaviour of exchange rates (or the target set by monetary policy), i.e., the 
de facto regime.  This is the approach of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Levy Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2001, 2003).  Their results show that looking at a de facto classification might 
provide very different results.  The distinction between words and actions also matters for other 
monetary policy targets such as money and inflation targets.  For example, there is plenty of 
evidence that central banks that declared themselves to be money targetters were not behaving as 
such (see, for example, Bernanke and Mihov (1997) for the case of the Bundesbank). 
12
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Rather than attempt to resolve this issue on a conceptual level, we look at both the effects 
of having a transparent de jure monetary regime, and whether or not it is hit de facto in practice. 
Dealing with endogeneity.  The interpretation of the existence of a correlation between 
inflation (or output volatility) and the exchange rate regime is problematic because of 
endogeneity.  Is inflation lower because of the fixed exchange rate regime? Or are countries with 
low inflation (or more distaste of inflation) more likely to adopt fixed exchange rate regimes? 
The literature has dealt with the issue of endogeneity by using a set of instrumental variables 
based on either economic or political arguments.
5 Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger and Reggio (2002) 
or von Hagen and Jizhong Zhou (2004) provide a comprehensive study of the endogeneity of 
exchange rate regimes.  Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein (2000), within the context of Latin America, 
use a similar framework.  Alesina and Wagner (2003) provide an analysis of how institutions 
affect decisions by countries to abandon fixed exchange rate regimes and to dissemble why such 
regimes are in place. 
The arguments about what determines the choice of an exchange rate regime are based on 
theories that highlight the economic costs and benefits of the regimes, as well as the political 
institutional environment in which different regimes might be preferable.  The economic 
variables are related to the optimum currency area debate.  What makes a country a better 
candidate to adopt the currency of a different country?  Openness, size, geographical 
concentration of country’s trade, the type of shocks (volatility of terms of trade, volatility of 
other nominal versus real shocks), financial dollarization all matter to assess these costs and 
benefits and have been used as instrumental variables in the literature.   
                                                 
5 A separate but related issue is the need to control for variables other than the monetary policy regime in the 
determination of inflation.  Romer (1993) or Lane (1997) are examples of papers that have studied how the 
determinants of the incentives of governments to inflate their economies. 
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The political arguments are more institutional, and concern the benefits of committing to 
a certain monetary policy.  From a theoretical point of view, fragmentation of power (measured 
by e.g., the fraction of seats in congress held by government, years in office, or a Herfindahl 
index of political parties) or political instability shape the benefits and costs of commitment 
when it comes to monetary policy or the exchange rate regime.  There is evidence that these 
variables matter (Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein (2000) or Edwards (1996)). 
The issue of endogeneity has rarely been studied in the case of money or inflation targets.  
One of the few exceptions is Gerlach (1999) in the context of inflation targets.  His results show 
that the adoption of inflation targets is more likely with low degree of central bank 
independence, less openness, countries that export a low number of goods and among members 
of the EU. 
 
3.  Methodology 
Our question is whether the establishment of a quantitative target for monetary policy 
matters for inflation, ceteris paribus, and also whether hitting a target (if it exists) matters.  We 
can think of two ways to proceed.  First, we could pursue case studies, as is done in much of the 
literature.  This has a number of advantages.  Precise details concerning monetary institutions, 
policy, and other factors can be used.  The underlying economy changes little, so one can focus 
on monetary policy.  It is difficult to measure monetary regimes perfectly; for instance some 
countries began dis-inflation programs without a contemporaneous switch in monetary regime 
(New Zealand in the late 1980s and Sweden in the mid 1990s come to mind).  Still, the case 
study approach has a big disadvantage: one does not end up with estimates that are general.  
Accordingly, in this paper we seek to extend the literature by pursuing an econometric approach 
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that spans both long periods of time and a number of countries.  The advantage of our approach 
is its generality, but it may come at the cost of precision.  In particular, we are forced to restrict 
ourselves to variables that can be measured similarly for a large number of observations; we 
highlight these issues below. 
 
3.a Benchmark model 
Our benchmark model is the following: 
 
Πit = β1DJTargetit + β2Successit  
 




where i denotes a country, t denotes a year, and 
•  Π denotes the annual inflation rate in percentage points 
•  DJTargett is a dummy variable that is one if the country had a quantitative monetary policy 
target during period t, and zero otherwise, 
•  γi is a set of nuisance coefficients, 
•  Success is a dummy variable that is one if the country hit its de jure quantitative target during 
t, and zero otherwise, 
•  Open is trade (exports plus imports) as a percentage of GDP, 
•  Budget is the government budget surplus (+) or deficit (-), as a percentage of GDP, 
•  BusCycle is the difference between real GDP growth and average (country-specific) GDP 
growth, measured in percentage points, 
•  GDPpc is the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita, 
•  GDP is the natural logarithm of real GDP, and 
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The two coefficients of interest to us are β1 and β2.  The first coefficient is of greatest 
interest; it represents the effect of having a formally declared de jure quantitative monetary target 
on inflation, ceteris paribus.  Also of interest to us is β2, which shows the effect on inflation of 
successfully hitting a quantitative monetary target (if one exists) de facto.   
The other regressors control for “nuisance” factors that affect inflation and might be 
correlated with the monetary policy regime, but are not of direct interest to us.  Romer (1993) 
argues that more open economies have lower inflation because the costs of monetary expansion 
are high when the country has high trade-to-GDP ratio.  More open economies might also opt for 
a fixed exchange rate relative to their trading partners as argued by the literature on the optimal 
currency areas.  This argument prompts us to include Open as a regressor.  The budget balance 
(Budget) can affect inflation by imposing requirements for money-financed deficits or through 
aggregate demand.  At the same time the success in hitting a monetary target can be affected by 
fiscal policy outcomes.  We also include the state of the business cycle (BusCycle) as a measure 
of aggregate demand pressures on the price level and as a covariate that might be correlated with 
the success of the monetary regime.  GDP per capita (GDPpc) enters the regression to account 
for the fact that rich countries have more sophisticated financial sectors, which implies higher 
opposition to inflation (as in Posen, 1995) and lower optimal inflation tax because of better-
developed standard tax instruments.  Posen’s argument also suggests that rich countries have low 
incentives to adopt an explicit target given that there is already pressure to achieve low inflation.  
Finally, the level of GDP is included to account for the market size.  Since market size can affect 
productivity as in the models of Romer (1986) or Lucas (1988), a larger country may have lower 
inflation ceteris paribus.  On the correlation between country size and explicit targets, one might 
argue that larger countries are less likely to adopt an exchange rate target. 
16
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Our benchmark regression is similar to those used by Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2001), and Ghosh et al.  (2002).  The theoretical motivation for their econometric specification 
is quite similar to ours, except that these studies focus only on the exchange rate regime.  
Campillo and Miron (1996) provide also a cross-sectional investigation of determinants of 
inflation and the regressors are almost identical to the ones we use, but they do not include any 
variable that captures the nature of the monetary regime.  
We estimate the model with least squares, and use robust standard errors.  Still, we are 
cognizant of a number of potential econometric pitfalls associated with this strategy (e.g., 
simultaneity).  Accordingly, we do perform extensive sensitivity analysis to take into account a 
variety of different issues. 
 
3.b Data Description 
A data appendix describes in detail the sources and the list of variables used in our 
empirical analysis.  Our annual data set spans 1960 through 2000, and includes all countries with 
1960 GDP per capita of at least $1000 dollars in the Penn World Table database for which 
comprehensive data are available. There is significant variation in monetary policy practices both 
over time and across countries in the data set. Exchange rate pegs are more common in the 
1960s, money targets disappear from many countries during the 1980s, inflation targeting only 
appears in the 90s. For most of our analysis we use annual frequency (given that we are not 
interested in high-frequency properties of the data), but we provide sensitivity analysis by 
replicating our results using five-year averages. 
We use two variables to characterize the monetary policy regime: whether or not there 
was an announced de jure target and whether or not the target was hit de facto.  Our approach is 
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complementary to that of the previous literature.  As mentioned in our literature review, previous 
papers have struggled with the issue of “words versus actions”.  Central banks often claim to 
have adopted strict monetary policy targets, whether they are monetary aggregates, exchange 
rates, or inflation targets.  In many cases these claims are not validated by their actions or the 
data.  Some obvious examples of this behavior include: countries that intervene on foreign 
exchange markets extensively despite having a floating exchange rate policy; missed targets for 
monetary aggregates; and missed inflation targets.  Our strategy is to capture with our de jure 
classification of monetary regimes the stated announcements of central banks, and then also to 
look separately at whether or not the target was hit in practice. 
Establishing a de jure classification for exchange rate and inflation targets is not 
conceptually complicated, though there is much debatable minutiae.  In the case of targets for 
monetary aggregates, there are several cases where a judgment call needs to be made; many 
central banks use monetary aggregates as reference indicators for their monetary policy without 
formally targeting money growth.  We try not to take this logic too far, because we are interested 
in words (not actions) for our de jure classification.  For example, the Bundesbank is classified 
as having a target for money even though we know that in practice the commitment to the target 
was weaker than the Buba’s words. 
There is one complication that we have to address before we proceed with the estimation 
of our benchmark model. Sometimes countries change their monetary regimes in mid-year. This 
presents a potential problem for our estimation because for the year when there is a change we 
will use data for the dependent variable and the controls that correspond to two regimes at the 
same time. Had we known the exact date of the regime change, we could remove that year. 
18
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Unfortunately we do not have this information for a good number of observations.
6  Accordingly, 
we delete adjacent years with different regimes, so that each regime shift entails two dropped 
observations.  The impact of a switch in monetary regime may be pronounced in the year when it 
takes effect, especially for countries that are engaged in a dis-inflation campaign, so this may 
dilute our estimates.
7  We feel most comfortable proceeding conservatively, and cannot see any 
bias associated introduced by this convention. 
Our de facto classification of monetary policy regimes provides a measure of whether or 
not the announced targets were met.  For simplicity, we classify monetary authorities as either 
hitting or missing their targets; that is we use a binary 0/1 variable to indicate success or failure 
of the monetary authorities in achieving their target.  Future work might consider finer or 
continuous gradations of success, since central banks often have partial success in hitting 
monetary targets.
8 
In the case of the exchange rate targets we make use of the Reinhart and Rogoff 
classification that characterizes exchange rate regimes by their actions (not their words).  This 
has the advantage of covering a broad array of countries, and was not created by us (so that it is 
objective).
9  In the case of inflation and money targets we simply compare the outcome (inflation 
or money growth) with the announced range for the target.  Still, we face several difficulties in 
making this comparison.  First, targets are sometimes expressed as a single number, while for 
                                                 
6  When we know the date of a regime shift, we follow the convention of dating it to the year when it was first in 
place for at least six months. 
7  For instance, when Canada introduced money growth targeting in 1976, its inflation fell from 10.8% the year 
before to 7.5%.  A more extreme example is the introduction of the Argentine convertibility; when it was introduced 
in 1991, inflation fell from over 2000% to around 170%. 
8  It would be natural to pursue this angle through a loss function approach, though there could be problems if the 
monetary target is a range rather than a point. 
9  Reinhart and Rogoff treat realignments from one fixed exchange rate to another as falling within a fixed exchange 
rate regime.  This is debatable; on the one hand, the central bank has not achieved its monetary target, while on the 
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others a range is provided.  When an explicit range is provided we simply assess whether or not 
the outcome is within the range.  If there is no band around the announced target, we either 
consider the target as a maximum (by establishing a range from 0 to the announced value) or we 
build a range around the target. We consider the value as a maximum when the central bank is 
clearly trying to bring inflation down and establishes a series of decreasing targets for the years 
ahead.  We add a range to the target when this is consistent with previous or future behavior of 
that central bank. For example, there are also instances where central banks switch from an 
explicit range to a single point.  In those cases we add a band of around the announced target of 
the same size as the band that was in place in previous years.
10  
The second difficulty associated with determining whether or not a target was hit is 
measuring the outcome.  Money and inflation targets are established for a specific measure of 
inflation or a monetary aggregate.  In some cases, the information about the precise measure 
being used is unavailable.  In others, we know the variable used, but have not been able to find 
the data.  As a result, we are missing some observations.  In the case of inflation, we use the CPI 
as our measure of the price index.  In the case of monetary aggregates, we normally use 
information on both target and outcome that originate from the same source.
11 
The appendix also provides two figures with a comprehensive set of simple country-by-
country time series plots of inflation; different monetary regimes are marked by different 
symbols.  During this period of time, lower inflation was typically better inflation, though not for 
all countries and period of time (e.g., Japan during the 1990s which probably experienced 
                                                 
10 In the very few cases where we cannot find information or a historical reference to establish a band, we use the 
convention of adding one percentage point to each side of the target. Details are provided in the data appendix.   
11  If this is not the case and the information on the specific monetary target being used is not available, then we 
leave the observation as missing. 
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excessively low inflation).  Thus our methodology does not deliver a message about welfare, and 
it would be inappropriate for a sample where inflation was typically low. 
Perhaps a more effective way to present the data graphically is through an “event study.”  
Figure 3 is a set of event studies that look at inflation around the dates of changes in monetary 
regime.  The top left-hand diagram examines inflation in the three years before, during (marked 
by the vertical line), and after entry; it considers entry into de jure regimes of any sort.  The 
middle line (with circles) shows the mean level of inflation, while the two other lines show a 
confidence interval of plus and minus two standard deviations.  The diagram in the top right-
hand corner is the analogue showing exits from de jure regimes, while the diagrams below are 
analogues that exclude the high-inflation countries. While none of the event studies is 
overwhelmingly persuasive, each of them provides a message consistent with the results we 
verify more rigorously below.  In particular, the entry intro a monetary regime with a 
quantitative target coincides with a reduction in inflation, while exits from such regimes are 
associated with increases. 
 
4.  Empirics 
4.a   Benchmark Results 
OLS estimation of our model results in the benchmark estimates presented in Table 1.  
The coefficient of greatest interest to us is β1, the effect on inflation of a country’s having a 
quantitative target for monetary policy of any type (whether an inflation target, a money growth 
target, or an exchange rate target).  The effect is both economically and statistically significant; 
the existence of a de jure target is estimated to lower annual inflation by about sixteen 
percentage points, with a t-statistic greater than five in absolute value (and hence different from 
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zero at all conventional significance levels).  This effect is enhanced if the quantitative target is 
actually hit.  A monetary target that is successfully achieved reduces inflation by another five 
percentage points, a result that is again highly statistically and economically significant. 
Our basic framework is perturbed in three ways in Table 1.  First, we drop the dummy 
variable for successful implementation of a quantitative monetary target.  Second and 
symmetrically, we also drop the dummy representing the existence of a quantitative target.  Each 
of the coefficients remains economically and statistically significant if the other is set to zero.  
Finally, we drop all the conditioning variables (that is, we set γ1=γ2=…=γ5=0). 
At first blush it seems that countries with transparent (quantitative) de jure monetary 
targets experience lower inflation.  Actually hitting the target lowers inflation further.  While the 
preliminary findings are positive, caveats certainly exist.  For one thing, the model fits the data 
poorly.  While many of the auxiliary regressors are correctly signed (more open economies have 
lower inflation; tight fiscal policy lowers inflation; richer economies have lower inflation), some 
are not (observations with higher-than-average growth display lower inflation).  Furthermore, a 
number of potentially important omitted variables and econometric complications come to mind 
quickly.  Accordingly, we now engage in sensitivity analysis. 
 
4.b Sensitivity Analysis 
Table 2 checks the sensitivity of the results with respect to the precise sample used for 
estimation.  First we drop observations before 1975.  Next we drop all observations where the 
(country x year) observation is for a country with real GDP per capita below $5,000.  Another 
perturbation restricts our attention to long-time OECD members (those that entered before 1975).  
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Next we drop outlier observations.
12  Our last two changes are to add in Argentina and Brazil, 
two high inflation countries, and then to drop all high inflation countries, defined as a country 
which experienced inflation exceeding 100% annually at any point in our sample (Chile, Israel, 
Mexico, Turkey and Uruguay).  It is striking that our key coefficient of interest – β1 – remains 
economically large and statistically significant in all of these perturbations.  (The size of the 
effect of course varies with the sample; excluding high-inflation countries reduces considerably 
the potential and actual influence of a quantitative monetary target.)  Further, β2 is also 
significantly negative (in both the economic and statistical senses) in all cases except when 
Argentina and Brazil are included in the sample.
13 
Do our results depend on regime switches associated with major oil price shocks?  No.  
In an appendix we tabulate the analogues to Tables 1 and 2, computed only with data after 1982.  
These show quite similar results to our benchmark results.  Appendix Table A6 tabulates 
estimates of the key coefficients computed from the four different decades of data.  Again, our 
key coefficients remain negative (and mostly significant at standard confidence levels) with the 
exception of the 1960s de jure coefficient, which is insignificantly positive.  It seems that 
restricting ourselves to data after the second OPEC oil price shock does not change our results 
substantively.
14 
In Table 3 we check the robustness of our results with respect to unobserved country- and 
time-specific factors.  We do this by adding successively: a) country-specific intercepts, b) year-
specific intercepts, and c) country- and year-specific intercepts simultaneously.  Using country-
                                                 
12  The latter are defined as observations with a residual estimated to lie more than 1.5 standard deviations from the 
mean of zero. 
13  We have also dropped the countries with maximal inflation exceeding 38.2% (which corresponds to the 75
th 
percentile of our sample), and countries with average inflation exceeding 13% (which again corresponds to the 75
th 
percentile of our sample).  In both cases, the coefficients on both de jure quantitative regimes and the success in 
hitting the target remain negative, though only the latter coefficients are significantly different from zero. 
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specific fixed effects is an important check, since it means that the estimation relies only on 
within-country variation in inflation and monetary regimes over time.  Using year-specific fixed 
effects because it accounts for any global factors such as oil prices global inflation and the global 
business cycle.  Another column of the table adds dynamics to the perturbation with both sets of 
fixed effects by modeling the error term as an AR(1) disturbance rather than serially 
uncorrelated.  Finally, we use the one-year lead of inflation in the last column on the right, since 
inflation responds to policy with a lag.
15  Again, our key coefficient remains negative and 
significant throughout (though adding country effects eliminates the significance of the effect of 
achieving a monetary target). 
Table 4 explores whether the three types of quantitative monetary policy targets – 
inflation, money growth, and exchange rate – have similar effects on inflation.  When the three 
different regimes are allowed to take on different coefficients, the inflation-targeting regime 
seems to have more of a dampening effect on inflation than the (similar) effects of either 
exchange rate or money growth targets. The differences between the three targets are significant 
at conventional confidence levels.  The effect of a successfully hit monetary target on inflation 
also varies by the type of target; surprisingly, the effect of successfully hitting an inflation target 
has a positive coefficient.
16  Still, the most important differences between different types of 
monetary regimes may be not in their outcomes, but their sustainability.  Many countries have 
abandoned both exchange rate and money growth targets; none has (yet) abandoned an inflation 
target.  Our analysis does not capture these differences, and this would be an interesting area for 
future research. 
                                                 
15  Using a lead of inflation also helps to reduce problems with endogeneity; more on that below. 
16  A closer inspection of the data reveals that several countries have indeed missed the target by having inflation 
below the target range. For example, Sweden in the 1990s had a range between 1% and 3% inflation, but in four 
years inflation was below 1%.  This result is fragile though; the coefficient becomes negative if country-specific 
fixed effects are added. 
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Table 5 shows that the effects of political instability on inflation are of negligible 
importance using revolutions and coups (the variables used by Campillo and Miron, 1996).  
While coups are associated with a drop in inflation, our key coefficients are little affected.  
Table 6 uses instrumental variables estimation to account for possible simultaneity in the 
equation.
17  We are particularly concerned with the possibility that high inflation induces the 
authorities to introduce or use quantitative targets.  There is also the possibility that a low 
inflation environment may encourage the authorities to lock in stability with a transparent 
monetary policy.   
As instrumental variables for both our de jure monetary dummy, and the dummy variable 
for de facto success in hitting this target, we use three political variables and two variables 
capturing social characteristics.  They are: a) political constraints (used by Henisz, (2000)); b) a 
dummy for (country x year) observations with a presidential electoral system (taken from 
Persson-Tabellini, 2001); c) a comparable dummy for observations with majoritarian electoral 
systems (again taken from Persson-Tabellini, 2001); d) the percentage of males over 25 years old 
with completed primary education; and e) the percentage of males over 25 years with completed 
secondary education.  We use these variables for a number of reasons.  The presence of political 
constraints in the country reveals an overall preference for rules.  In addition, countries with 
more political constraints have more disciplined fiscal policy.  With more discipline on the fiscal 
side it is more likely that that a monetary regime is sustainable.  A somewhat different argument 
is that if political constraints restrict fiscal policy, then society might prefer to leave monetary 
policy unconstrained and assign to it a bigger role in smoothing business cycle fluctuations.  The 
nature of the political system (presidential vs. parliamentary) affects regime choice in a similar 
                                                 
17  Measurement error is also a potential issue, especially for de jure monetary performance; as we note above, there 
may be issues associated especially with exchange rate realignments. 
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way.  Presidential regimes are often characterized by better separation of powers than 
parliamentary ones, because the president cannot be subjected to a no-confidence vote by the 
parliament (except under rare circumstances of impeachment).  The executive in a parliamentary 
system, on the other hand, can be more easily removed.  The separation of powers in a 
presidential system again makes fiscal policy rather constrained, which boosts the case for 
having flexible monetary policy.  The electoral system matters because countries with 
majoritarian systems are associated with stronger governments relative to those with proportional 
representation.  Proportional systems often lead to the need for coalitions to form a government; 
Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger and Reggio (2002) argue coalition governments are more prone to be 
influenced by special interests.  To avoid a situation where special interests affect monetary 
policy, the society might opt for a regime with an explicit target.  Hence majoritarian systems 
should be linked with a more flexible regime. Finally the two education variables are used since 
more educated societies may insist on having institutions for low inflation, while education has 
no direct effect on inflation. 
We provide four different perturbations of our IV results: benchmark; with country-fixed 
effects; with year intercepts; and with both.  The standard errors for the coefficients of interest 
are considerably higher, indicating that the first-stage regressions do not fit well.  That is, our 
instrumental variables do not work particularly well.  This is even more obvious from the 
dramatic increase in the size of the effects; the IV estimates of β1 are approximately three times 
the magnitude of the OLS estimates.  Once we control for unobserved country fixed effects, the 
coefficient on monetary success in hitting a quantitative target becomes positive and significant. 
It is difficult to provide a reasonable interpretation of this reversal. The effect of de jure regime 
on inflation is, however, consistently negative and highly significant. The final four columns add 
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as instrumental variables the lags of the de jure regime and de facto monetary success.
18  These 
instruments help with addressing issues of omitted variables (e.g. a beneficial supply shock that 
leads to lower inflation and also helps the central bank hit the target). The results are highly 
significant and consistent with the findings of our benchmark model.   
Our final set of experiments moves away from the annual domain to consider data 
averaged over mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive five-year intervals between 1960 and 
1999 (1960-64, 1965-69, and so forth).  These are contained in Table 7, which tabulates our key 
coefficients estimated twelve different ways.  For convenience, the auxiliary regressors 
(openness, the budget, and so forth) are included in the regressions but not explicitly tabulated.  
The benchmark equation is presented in the top row.  The other eleven perturbations we consider 
include: a) dropping observations before 1975; b) dropping all (time period x country) 
observations with real GDP per capita below $5,000; c) dropping all controls (i.e., setting 
γ1=γ2=…=γ5=0); d) adding Argentina and Brazil; e) dropping our five high inflation countries 
(Chile, Israel, Mexico, Turkey and Uruguay); f) adding country intercepts; g) adding time-period 
effects; h) adding both country- and time-period fixed effects; i) adding an AR(1) residual to the 
country- and time-period intercepts; j) using IV on the benchmark equation; and k) using IV with 
country and time-period intercepts.  Our key coefficient, β1, remains negative, economically 
large and statistically significant except when we exclude our high inflation countries and when 
we estimate the model by IV with time and country effects. Also when we include AR(1) errors 
into panel estimation the significance drops to about 10% level.  This is ground for some caution, 
but not perhaps too much.  Smoothing the data and excluding countries that have ever 
                                                 
18  This effectively deals with supply shocks that affect both inflation and the probability of de facto monetary 
success (since the lag of the de jure regime is collinear with the contemporaneous value). 
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experienced high inflation may simply reduce the variation in inflation too much to allow the 
effects of a quantitative target to be detectable.
19 
 
4.c Output Volatility  
We now briefly present results on output volatility, which we investigate for two reasons.   
Many central banks (such as “flexible” inflation-targeters) care about stabilizing the output gap.  
We are also interested to see if the effects of transparent monetary regimes that we uncovered 
above come at the expense of increased output volatility. 
Our benchmark model for the volatility regression is analogous to that for inflation: 
 
 




where i denotes a country, t denotes a 5-year period, and 
•  σ denotes output volatility (defined carefully below), and 
•  other variables are as defined above. 
 
For output volatility, we initially use the five-year average absolute deviation of output 
growth from mean growth (calculated from annual data).  That is, we first compute the country-
specific mean growth rate using the entire span of annual data, which we denote as 
it t i GDP T GDP ∆ Σ ≡ ∆ ) / 1 ( , then compute our regressand as  | | ) 5 / 1 ( i it it GDP GDP ∆ − ∆ Σ ≡ τ σ  for 
non-overlapping, mutually exclusive five-year periods, where GDP denotes the natural logarithm 
of GDP.
20 
                                                 
19  We have also searched without success for an effect of quantitative regimes on inflation volatility.  Our results are 
in an appendix, and are likely the result of the well-known correlation between the level and volatility of inflation. 
20  We would prefer to use the volatility of the “output gap”; that is (the volatility of) deviations of output from that 
which would prevail if all prices were flexible.  Constructing the output gap for a wide array of countries is beyond 
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We start directly with five-year averages in order to provide a better estimate of business 
cycle volatility.  The coefficients of interest again are β1 and β2.  The benchmark results for the 
volatility equation are reported in Table 8.  From the first column we conclude, that the 
coefficients on both de jure and de facto regimes are not statistically significant at the 5% level 
of significance.  This implies that having an explicit target does not affect output volatility – that 
is, average absolute deviation of output growth from its mean.  If the target is successfully 
achieved, however, then the volatility is reduced by about half of a percentage point. This result 
should not be over-interpreted as it is significant only at the 10% level.  
The rest of Table 8 reports several sensitivity checks.  In column 2 we drop the dummy 
for “Success in achieving the target” and in column 3 we drop the de jure variable.  In both cases 
the estimates of the regime remain insignificant. Adding a lag of our volatility measure does not 
change the main conclusion that explicit targets do not affect significantly volatility of output. 
In Table 9 we explore the sensitivity of these results in several dimensions.  We start by 
including Argentina and Brazil in column (1) and by removing all of the high inflators in column 
(2). Again, hitting the target has a negative effect on volatility but statistically this result is 
significant at the 10% level at best. Adding unobserved time effects increases the significance of 
the success variable, but overall we find that there is little evidence to support any claim on the 
effect of policy regimes on output volatility.  
Table 10 dis-aggregates the effects of monetary regimes on output volatility into those 
due to inflation, money growth, and exchange rate targets.  There are no significant results that 
one can interpret here. Table 11 pursues instrumental variable estimation so as to account for 
endogeneity.  When we use our political and education variables as instrumental variables, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
the scope of our project.  Still, we see no reason why other de-trending techniques could not be used, such as those 
proposed by Hodrick and Prescott or Baxter and King.  Constructing the output gap would also enable the sacrifice 
ratio to be compared across monetary regimes, which seems a worthwhile objective. 
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also when we add lagged regimes, the effects of de jure and de facto regimes remain statistically 
insignificant, which could be again a signal that these are poor instruments or that volatility is 
indeed unrelated to the monetary policy regime.  Finally, in Table 12 we provide analogues to 
OLS and IV estimation of our default model, but measuring output volatility in three different 
ways: a) the average absolute value of the deviation of real GDP from HP-filtered real GDP (in 
logs), b) the average absolute value of deviation of output growth from a ten-year average 
growth rate, or c) the standard deviation of output growth computed over (mutually exclusive) 
decades of annual data.
21  The estimates of having a de jure quantitative monetary target are 
insignificant, but the estimates for successfully hitting this target are typically but not 
overwhelmingly statistically significant. 
The conclusion from the volatility regressions is that, at a minimum, having an explicit 
monetary target does not increase the volatility of the economy.  On the contrary, our evidence 
suggests that the coefficients on successfully hitting a target are negatively and significantly (in 
the economic sense) associated with lower volatility.  Under several perturbations of our model 
these coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we investigate the effect of quantitative targets for monetary policy on 
inflation and business cycle volatility.  We combine data for three types of targets for monetary 
policy (exchange rate targets, money growth targets, and inflation targets), so as to be able to 
compare the effects of both having and hitting transparent objectives for monetary policy against 
the alternative of having unclear or qualitative goals.  Using a panel of macroeconomic data 
covering over forty years of annual data and countries, we find that having a quantitative de jure 
                                                 
21  We use a smoothing parameter of λ=100. 
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target for the monetary authority tends to lower inflation and smooth business cycles; hitting that 
target de facto has further positive effects.  These effects are economically large, typically 
statistically significant and reasonably insensitive to perturbations in our econometric 
methodology.  Differences in the exact form of the monetary regime have more minor effects on 
actual inflation than having some quantitative target, though some monetary regimes seem more 
easily sustainable than others. 
During the past decade, there has been much emphasis placed on the importance of 
transparent goals for monetary authorities; the current consensus is that central banks should 
independently pursue well-defined goals in a transparent fashion.  Our results lead us to conclude 
that this emphasis seems justified. 
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Table 1: Benchmark OLS Inflation Results 

























































Observations  1200 1340  1200  1408 
R
2  .19 .19  .16  .13 
Regressand is inflation.  Annual data, 1960-2000 for 40 countries. 




Table 2: Sample Sensitivity 
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Observations  817 989 699  1198  1232  1067 
R
2  .25 .31 .40 .27 .08 .24 
Regressand is inflation.  Annual data, 1960-2000 for 40 countries. 
OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses.  Intercepts included but not tabulated. 
High Inflation countries are: Chile, Israel, Mexico, Turkey, and Uruguay. 
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AR(1) Coefficient      .87   
Observations  1200 1200 1200 1161 1203 
R
2  .09 .19 .06 .01 .20 
Regressand is inflation.  Annual data, 1960-2000 for 40 countries. 
OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses.  Intercepts included but not tabulated. 
 
 
Table 4: Dis-Aggregating Monetary Regimes 



























































Observations  1023 1200 
R
2  .18 .17 
Regressand is inflation.  Annual data, 1960-2000 for 40 countries. 
OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses.  Intercepts included but not tabulated. 
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Table 5: The Role of Political Stability 






































Revolutions  1.86 
(1.89) 
 
Coups   -6.23 
(2.65) 
Observations  1195 1197 
R
2  .19 .19 
Regressand is inflation.  Annual data, 1960-2000 for 40 countries unless noted. 
OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses.  Intercepts included but not tabulated. 
 
 
Table 6: Instrumental Variable Results 
Instrumental 
variables 

















































































































































Observations  1149  1149  1149 1149 1149 1149 1149 1149 
R
2  0.09 .01  .17 .01 .20 .09 .19 .06 
Regressand is inflation.  Annual data, 1960-2000 for 40 countries. 
IV with robust standard errors in parentheses.  Intercepts included but not tabulated. 
Political instrumental variables for de jure quantitative monetary target and quantitative monetary success are: a) 
political constraints (Henisz); b) Presidential Electoral System (Persson-Tabellini); c) Majoritarian electoral system 
(Persson-Tabellini); d) Percentage of males over 25 years old with primary education (Barro-Lee); and e) Percentage 
of males over 25 years old with secondary education (Barro-Lee); 
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Table 7: Using Five-Year Averaged Data 
  De Jure Quantitative 
Monetary Target (β1) 
Quantitative Monetary 
Target Hit (β2) 






































With Year and Country 















Regressand is inflation.  Data in 5-yr averages, derived from annual observations 1960-1999 for 40 countries. 
Controls added but not recorded: openness; budget; business cycle growth deviation from mean; and logs of real 
GDP and real GDP per capita. 
OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses.  Intercepts included but not tabulated. 
High Inflation countries are: Chile, Israel, Mexico, Turkey, and Uruguay. 
Instrumental variables for de jure quantitative monetary target and quantitative monetary success the following 
political variables: a) political constraints (Henisz); b) Presidential Electoral System (Persson-Tabellini); and c) 
Majoritarian electoral system (Persson-Tabellini). d) Percentage of males over 25 years old with primary education 
(Barro-Lee); and e) Percentage of males over 25 years old with secondary education (Barro-Lee); 
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Table 8: Effects of Regimes on Output Volatility: Benchmark Results. 




























































Lag of volatility      . 1 1  
(.08) 
 
Observations  211 211 211 153 237 
R
2  .21 .20 .21 .31 .01 
Regressand is the average absolute value of the deviation of output growth from the mean growth rate.   
Data in 5-year averages derived from annual observations 1960-1999 for 40 countries.   
OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses.  Intercepts included but not tabulated. 
 
 





















































































Observations  219 196 211 211 211 
R
2  .18 .21 .24  .001 .05 
Regressand is the average absolute value of the deviation of output growth from the mean growth rate.   
Data in 5-year averages derived from annual observations 1960-1999 for 40 countries.   
OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses.  Intercepts included but not tabulated 
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Table 10: Output Volatility and Dis-Aggregated Monetary Regimes 





















































Observations  182 211 
R
2  .21 .21 
Regressand is the average absolute value of the deviation of output growth from the mean growth rate.   
Data in 5-year averages derived from annual observations 1960-1999 for 40 countries.   
OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses.  Intercepts included but not tabulated 
 
Table 11: Effects of policy regime on output volatility.  Instrumental Variable Results 


































































Observations  202 202  147  147 
R
2  .17 .00  .30  .11 
Regressand is the average absolute value of the deviation of output growth from the mean growth rate.   
Data in 5-year averages derived from annual observations 1960-1999 for 40 countries.  IV with robust standard 
errors in parentheses.  Intercepts included but not tabulated. Instrumental variables for de jure quantitative monetary 
target and quantitative monetary success are: a) political constraints (Henisz); b) Presidential Electoral System 
(Persson-Tabellini); c) Majoritarian electoral system (Persson-Tabellini) d) Percentage of males over 25 years old 
with primary education (Barro-Lee); and e) Percentage of males over 25 years old with secondary education (Barro-
Lee);  “Lags”  adds: d) lag of de jure quantitative monetary target; and e) lag of quantitative monetary success. 
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Std.  Dev. 
Decadal 
Std.  Dev. 
 OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
















































































Observations  211 147  90  86  90  86 
R
2  .17 - .32  -  .30 - 
Regressand is: a) average absolute value of the deviation of real GDP from HP-filtered real GDP (in logs), b) 
average absolute value of deviation of output growth from a ten-year average growth rate, or c) decadal standard 
deviation of output growth. 
Data derived from annual observations 1960-1999 for 40 countries.   
OLS/IV with robust standard errors in parentheses.  Intercepts included but not tabulated. 
Instrumental variables for de jure quantitative monetary target and quantitative monetary success are: a) political 
constraints (Henisz); b) Presidential Electoral System (Persson-Tabellini); c) Majoritarian electoral system (Persson-
Tabellini); d) Percentage of males over 25 years old with primary education (Barro-Lee); and e) Percentage of males 
over 25 years old with secondary education (Barro-Lee); 
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Appendix 1: Growth 
We briefly turn in passing to the effects of the monetary policy regime on economic 
growth.  This question has been an issue of heated debate.  The most recent evidence on the issue 
comes from the paper of Levi-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) who document that in a large set 
of countries a fixed exchange rate regime leads to lower economic growth.  To address this 
question in our data set we use as a benchmark model following specification: 
 
 
∆yit = β1DJTargetit + β2Successit  
 
+ γ1Openit + γ2GovSpendit-1 + γ3GDPpcit-1 + γ4 PopGRit-1 + γ4 Secondaryit-1+ εit 
 
where i denotes a country, t denotes a five-year period, and t-1 denotes the average over the 
previous (non-overlapping) five-year period.  The other variables are: 
•  ∆y denotes the five-year average growth rate of country i calculated from annual data 
•  DJTargett is a dummy variable that is one if the country had a quantitative monetary policy 
target during period t, and zero otherwise, 
•  γi is a set of nuisance coefficients, 
•  Success is a dummy variable that is one if the country hit its de jure quantitative target during 
t, and zero otherwise, 
•  Open is trade (exports plus imports) as a percentage of GDP, 
•  GovSpend is government spending as a percentage of GDP, 
•  GDPpc is the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita from the previous five-year period, 
•  PopGR is the growth rate of population 
•  Secondary is the percentage of males over 25 years old with completed secondary degree of 
education 
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The specification of the controls in the growth regression is standard.  The initial GDP 
per capita is expected to have a negative sign under the conditional convergence hypothesis, 
openness should enter with a positive sign as more open economies are expected to grow faster 
(Frankel and Romer, 1999), higher government spending will slow down economic growth, 
which implies a negative sign for γ2; population growth can be positively correlated with real 
growth and negatively with the growth rate of real GDP per capita; and, education is expected to 
be positively correlated with output growth.  We have decided to use again five-year averages 
because most of the theories cited above refer to long-term growth rates and the five-year 
average seems to be the shortest period for which one can reasonably argue that the variables 
capture long-term growth rates.   
Table A1 starts with the benchmark results in the first column.  The first coefficient of 
interest, which captures the effect of an explicit target on growth, is insignificant statistically and 
it implies that the economic impact of an explicit target is negligible.  The success in 
implementing the target is negative, but again insignificant. Although the fit of the regression is 
relatively good with an R
2 of 50%, it seems that neither having, not hitting the target affects 
economic growth in our sample of countries.    
In Table A2, we report some standard robustness checks.  In general we do not find much 
evidence to support a claim that monetary targets affect growth positively or negatively. Only 
when time effects are included in the regression, there is some evidence that having a target is 
significant the 5% level.  
Overall we find some evidence that the having an explicit target leads to faster economic 
growth, but we quickly point out that this evidence is quite fragile and most of the time 
insignificant at conventional levels.  
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Table A1: Policy Regime and Growth: Benchmark Results. 





























































Observations  106 106 106 237 
R
2  .50 .50 .48 .08 
Regressand is the average growth rate of output over five-year periods.   
Data in 5-year averages derived from annual observations 1960-1999 for 42 countries.   









































































































Observations  108 103 106 137 137 
R
2  .50 .53 .58 .37 .45 
Regressand is the average growth rate of output over five-year (non-overlapping) periods.   
Data in 5-year averages derived from annual observations 1960-1999 for 42 countries.   
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Appendix 2: Adding Inflation Volatility  
We briefly investigate the effect of monetary policy regimes on inflation volatility. The 
key results are reported in Table A3. Inflation volatility is calculated over five-year periods, and 
the rest of the data are also averaged over non-overlapping 5-year periods (so as to conform to 
the calculation of inflation volatility). Table A3 is a modified version of Table 1 in which 
baseline regressions are estimated twice – with and without the level of inflation as a regressor.  
Is there any effect of regimes on the volatility of inflation above and beyond the well-
known correlation between the level and the variance of inflation?  Our results suggest that 
although the de jure regime does have a small negative effect on inflation volatility, this effect 
disappears once the level of inflation is included as a regressor. We interpret this as indicating 
that countries with explicit targets have lower inflation (as we have documented above) and 
lower inflation is also less volatile inflation. Thus the main effect of regimes goes through the 
level of inflation. This result is also robust to various specification changes. 
 
Table A3: Inflation Volatility as Dependent Variable 






































Inflation   8.8 
(4.3) 
Observations  208 208 
R
2  .13 .48 
Regressand is inflation volatility.  Five-year averaged data, 1960-2000 for 42 countries. 
OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses.  Intercepts included but not tabulated. 
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Appendix 3: Post-1982 Sample 
 
Table A4: Benchmark OLS Inflation Results, post-1982 

























































Observations  559 559  559  642 
R
2  .32 .31  .27  .18 
Regressand is inflation.  Annual data, 1983-2000 for 40 countries. 




Table A5: Sample Sensitivity of post-1982 Results 





























































BusCycle (Growth – 































Observations  505 318 559 584 491 
R
2  0.32 .63 0.32 0.10  0.39 
Regressand is inflation.  Annual data, 1983-2000 for 40 countries. 
OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses.  Intercepts included but not tabulated. 
High Inflation countries are: Chile, Israel, Mexico, Turkey, and Uruguay. 
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Table A6: Decade by Decade Inflation Results, using Benchmark OLS  
  De Jure Quantitative 
Monetary Target (β1) 
Quantitative Monetary 
Target Hit (β2) 
















Regressand is inflation.  Annual observations for individual decades for 40 countries. 
Controls added but not recorded: openness; budget; business cycle growth deviation from mean; and logs of real 
GDP and real GDP per capita. 
OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses.  Intercepts included but not tabulated. 
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Appendix 4: Classification of Monetary Policy Regimes 
 
Exchange Rate Targets 
Data on exchange rate regimes comes from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), downloaded from 
Carmen Reinhart’s web site.  The de jure classification is based on the official IMF 
classification. We label all observations as having an exchange rate target with the exception of 
those in the category “freely floating.”  The de facto classification is based on the Reinhart-
Rogoff “natural” classification.  Additional materials are available at Carmen Reinhart’s web 
site for detailed analysis of each of the countries.  
 
Sources for Inflation and Money Growth Targets  
The data on inflation and money targets comes from different sources.  Our main references are 
Cottarelli and Giannini (1997) (CG) for all regimes, and Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) 
(MS) for inflation targets.  In addition, for developed countries, we also use Agenor (2002). 
Other general references for inflation and money targets are Sterne (2002), Siklos (1999) and 
Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999). For recent years, web sites of the corresponding 
central bank have also been used as confirmation. In some cases, there are disagreements about 
the sources on the starting year (especially for money growth targets). 
 
Inflation Targets 
There are few cases of disagreement on the years where inflation targets were present.  There are 
some minor disagreements on the exact month were the policy was started (and in those cases we 
make a judgement call).  The same is true for the ranges set for the inflation target that we use to 
assess whether the target was hit or not. The biggest complication is to define a range when a 
single point is used as a target. In some cases we take the single number as maximum and set a 
range for 0% to that number. We do this when there is clear evidence that the central bank is 
trying to reduce inflation. In some other cases we set a band around this central point. We look 
for a historical reference within the same central bank to establish the size of the band (for 
example, a band set in previous years or in the years that follow). In the absence of any historical 
reference, we use +/– 1%. 
 
Money Targets 
The classification of money targeters is more difficult, since there are a number of central banks 
that use money aggregates as “references” but cannot be properly considered as having a target 
for money (for the same reason that most central banks use inflation forecasts but we have not 
included them as targeting inflation).  We do not wish to be too strict because we want to base 
our classification as much as possible on the words used by central banks, not on their actions, 
given that we also check whether targets have been met or not.  We collect as much information 
as possible on each of the central banks and make a judgement call on whether or not the central 
bank had a target for a monetary aggregate that was meaningful.  Where appropriate, we note 
issues in comments below the tables that follow. 
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De jure Classifications of Monetary Policy Regimes 
 
Argentina   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1978  Yes  No  No 
 1979  Yes  No  Yes 
 1979-1988  Yes  No  No 
 1989-1990  No  No  No 
 1990-2000  Yes  No  No 
Comments: Money target was in place in 1979 according to CG who claims “the central bank announced the 
commitment to monitor the attainment of the announced (credit) targets”. 
 
Australia   Exchange  Rate Inflation  Money 
 1960-1975  Yes  No  No 
 1976-1983  Yes  No  Yes 
 1984  No  No  Yes 
 1985-1992  No  No  No 
 1993-2000  No  Yes  No 
Comments: Monetary targeting starts in March 1976 and finishes in January 1985. Source: CG, Edey (1997) and 
Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin (October 1997).  Inflation targeting starts in January 1993. Range for inflation is 
2-3%. 
 
Austria   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1998  Yes  No  No 
 1999-2000  No  Yes  Yes 
Comments: After 1999, Austria becomes part of EMU so policies are ECB policies. 
 
Belgium   Exchange  Rate Inflation  Money 
 1960-1998  Yes  No  No 
 1999-2000  No  Yes  Yes 
Comments: After 1999, Belgium becomes part of EMU so policies are ECB policies. 
 
Botswana   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1969  Yes  No  No 
 
Brazil   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1976  Yes  No  No 
 1977  Yes  No  Yes 
 1978-1989  Yes  No  No 
 1990-1993  No  No  No 
 1994-1998  Yes  No  No 
 1999-2000  No  Yes  No 
Comments: In 1997 Brazil adopts a money target on top of the exchange rate target (source: CG). Inflation targeting 
starts in June 1999. Source for inflation target and range: MS.  
 
Canada   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1969  Yes  No  No 
 1970-1975  No  No  No 
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 1976-1982  No  No  Yes 
 1983-1990  No  No  No 
 1991-2000  No  Yes  No 
Comments: Money target first announced in November 1975 and dropped in November 1982. Sources: CG, Reserve 
Bank of Australia Bulletin (October 1997). Inflation targeting starts in February 1991. Source for inflation target and 
range: MS.  
 
Chile   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1961  Yes  No  No 
 1962-1964  No  No  No 
 1965-1990  Yes  No  No 
 1991-1999  Yes  Yes  No 
 2000  No  Yes  No 
Comments: Inflation targeting starts in January 1991 (Source: MS). Single point ranges replace range for inflation in 
the period 1995-2000. We add a range of +/- 1% to those years, which is consistent with the range that existed prior 
to 1994 (and also the range in place for 2001).  
 
Colombia   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1992  Yes  No  No 
 1993-1998  Yes  No  Yes 
 1999  No  No  Yes 
 2000  No  Yes  Yes 
Comments: Years for money targeting from: CG (Target announced in November 1992) and Informe de Inflacion, 
Central Bank of Colombia (recent years). Inflation target adopted in September 1999. We interpret the target of 10% 
as a maximum (consistent with inflation reports by central bank). 
  
Costa Rica    Exchange Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1991  Yes  No  No 
 1992-1994  No  No  No 
 1995-2000  Yes  No  No 
 
Denmark   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-2000  Yes  No  No 
 
Finland   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1991  Yes  No  No 
 1992  No  No  No 
 1993-1995  No  Yes  No 
 1996-1998  Yes  Yes  No 
 1999-2000  No  Yes  Yes 
Comments: Starting date for inflation targeting is February 1993 (source: MS). After 1999, Finland becomes part of 
EMU so policies are ECB policies. For the targets before 1999 we interpret 2% as a maximum, which is consistent 
with the way we interpret ECB policies after 1999. 
 
France   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1976  Yes  No  No 
 1977-1998  Yes  No  Yes 
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 1999-2000  No  Yes  Yes 
Comments: Sources for money target years: CG and Bank of France. After 1999, France becomes part of EMU so 
policies are ECB policies. 
 
Germany   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1970  Yes  No  No 
 1971  No  No  No 
 1972-1974  Yes  No  No 
 1975-1998  Yes  No  Yes 
 1999-2000  No  Yes  Yes 
Comments: After 1999, Germany becomes part of EMU so policies are ECB policies. 
 
Greece   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1969  Yes  No  No 
 1970-1994  Yes  No  Yes 
 1995-1999  Yes  No  No 
 1999-2000  No  Yes  Yes 
Comments: Source for Money target years: CG. After 1999, Greece becomes part of EMU so policies are ECB 
policies. 
 
Hong Kong   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-2000  Yes  No  No 
 
Ireland   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1998  Yes  No  No 
 1999-2000  No  Yes  Yes 
Comments: After 1999, Ireland becomes part of EMU so policies are ECB policies. 
 
Israel   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1976  Yes  No  No 
 1977-1984  No  No  No 
 1985-1991  Yes  No  No 
 1992-2000  Yes  Yes  No 
Comments: Inflation target adopted in January 1992 (source: MS). We add a range of +/- 1% added in years where 
single point range is announced, which is consistent with the years where the band was explicit. 
 
Italy   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1971  Yes  No  No 
 1972-1973  No  No  No 
 1974-1978  No  No  Yes 
 1979-1991  Yes  No  Yes 
 1992-1995  No  No  Yes 
 1996-1998  Yes  No  Yes 
 1999-2000  No  Yes  Yes 
Comments: Source for Money target years: CG and annual reports Bank of Italy. After 1999, Italy becomes part of 
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Japan   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1972  Yes  No  No 
 1973-2000  No  No  No 
 
Korea   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1978  Yes  No  No 
 1979-1996  Yes  No  Yes 
 1997  No  No  Yes 
 1998-2000  No  Yes  Yes 
Comments: Source: CG (until 1994) and document “Monetary Policy in Korea” (Bank of Korea). Money stopped 
being a target in 2001. Notice that from 1997 onwards the monetary aggregate that was targeted was changed and 
that there was a double domestic target (inflation and money) “based on the ECB”. Range for inflation target from 
MS and confirmed by web site of Bank of Korea. 
 
Malaysia   Exchange  Rate Inflation  Money 
 1960-1997  Yes  No  No 
 1998  No  No  No 
 1999-2000  Yes  No  No 
 
Mauritius   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1997  Yes  No  No 
 1998-2000  No  No  No 
 
Mexico   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1993  Yes  No  No 
 1994-1998  No  No  No 
 1999-2000  No  Yes  No 
Comments: Date of adoption of inflation target is January 1999 (source: MS). Point targets interpreted as maximum.  
 
Netherlands   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1998  Yes  No  No 
 1999-2000  No  Yes  Yes 
Comments: After 1999, the Netherlands becomes part of EMU so policies are ECB policies. 
 
New Zealand   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1983  Yes  No  No 
 1984-1989  No  No  No 
 1990-2000  No  Yes  No 
Comments: Date of adoption inflation target is March 1990 (source: MS). 
 
Norway   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1991  Yes  No  No 
 1992-1994  No  No  No 
 1995-2000  Yes  No  No 
 
Panama   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
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 1960-2000  Yes  No  No 
 
Paraguay   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1989  Yes  No  No 
 1990-1997  No  No  No 
 1998-2000  No  No  Yes 
 
Portugal   Exchange  Rate Inflation  Money 
 1960-1998  Yes  No  No 
 1999-2000  No  Yes  Yes 
Comments: After 1999, Portugal becomes part of EMU so policies are ECB policies. 
 
Singapore   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1962  No  No  No 
 1963-2000  Yes  No  No 
 
South Africa   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1982  Yes  No  No 
 1983-1985  No  No  No 
 1986-1999  No  No  Yes 
 2000  No  Yes  No 
Comments: Money targets replaced by Inflation targeting in February 2000 (Source: CG until 1994 complemented 
for recent years with document named “Monetary Policy in South Africa” downloaded from the web site of the SA 
Central Bank). 
 
Spain   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1973  Yes  No  No 
 1974-1975  No  No  No 
 1976-1977  Yes  No  No 
 1978-1983  Yes  No  Yes 
 1984-1988  No  No  Yes 
 1989-1994  Yes  No  Yes 
 1995-1998  Yes  Yes  No 
 1999-2000  No  Yes  Yes 
Comments: Source for money target years is CG and Sterne (Bank of England, 2000) who confirm that the Bank of 
Spain dropped money targets in 1994 and adopted inflation targets in 1995 (“a new framework based on inflation 
targeting was announced in January 1995”). After 1999, Spain becomes part of EMU so policies are ECB policies. 
Source for inflation target and range: MS. 
 
Sweden   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1992  Yes  No  No 
 1993-2000  Yes  Yes  No 
Comments: Date of adoption inflation target is January 1993 (source: MS). 
 
Switzerland   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1972  Yes  No  No 
 1973-1974  No  No  No 
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 1975-1977  No  No  Yes 
 1978  Yes  No  Yes 
 1979  Yes  No  No 
 1980-1981  Yes  No  Yes 
 1982-1999  No  No  Yes 
 2000  No  Yes  No 
Comments: Source for Money target years: CG, Rich (JME 1997) and Annual reports Bank of Switzerland. Annual 
target was put in place in 1975 and abandoned in the Fall of 1978. Reinstated later in 1980 and replaced in 1990 by 
medium-term targets for 5 year periods. Inflation target starts in January 2000. Source for inflation target and range: 
MS and confirmed by Central Bank web site.  
 
Thailand   Exchange  Rate Inflation  Money 
 1960-1996  Yes  No  No 
 1997-1999  No  No  No 
 2000  No  Yes  No 
Comments: Inflation target adopted in April 2000. Source for inflation target and range: MS. 
 
Trin&Tob.   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1969  No  No  No 
 
Tunisia   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-2000  Yes  No  No 
 
Turkey   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1989  Yes  No  No 
 1990-1992  Yes  No  Yes 
 1993-2000  Yes  No  No 
Comments: Source for Money target years: CG and Sterne, who confirms that it was abandoned during 1992. 
 
Uruguay   Exchange  Rate Inflation  Money 
 1960  No  No  No 
 1961  Yes  No  No 
 1962-1963  No  No  No 
 1964  Yes  No  No 
 1965  No  No  No 
 1966-1969  Yes  No  No 
 1970-1973  Yes  No  Yes 
 1974-1981  Yes  No  No 
 1982-1985  No  No  No 
 1986-1989  No  No  Yes 
 1990-1992  No  No  No 
 1993-2000  Yes  No  No 
Comments: Source for Money target years: CG. 
 
UK   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1971  Yes  No  No 
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 1972-1976  No  No  No 
 1977-1990  No  No  Yes 
 1991-1992  Yes  No  Yes 
 1993-1996  No  Yes  Yes 
 1997-2000  No  Yes  No 
Comments: Source for money target years Edey, Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, October 1996 and Sterne, 
Band of England. Inflation target starting in October 1992 (source: MS). We use a range of +/- 1% around central 
inflation target.   
 
USA   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1972  Yes  No  No 
 1973-1974  No  No  No 
 1975-1995  No  No  Yes 
 1996-2000  No  No  No 
Comments: Source for Money target years: CG and annual reports Federal Reserve. After reading annual reports, 
the word “Target” stops appearing in the 1996 report so we pick 1995 as a .  
 
Venezuela   Exchange  Rate  Inflation  Money 
 1960-1988  Yes  No  No 
 1989-1993  No  No  No 
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Inflation with different De Jure Monetary Regimes, 1960-2000
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Event Studies of Inflation around Monetary Regime Transitions
Mean and +/- 2se CI, 3 years around Transition: Tranquil Means marked
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